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UNITED STATES v. RUIZ-GAXIOLA: 
SETTING THE STANDARD FOR 
MEDICATING DEFENDANTS 
INVOLUNTARILY IN THE              
NINTH CIRCUIT 
INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the government could not 
medicate a defendant involuntarily for the sole purpose of rendering the 
defendant competent to stand trial.1  The court relied on the Sell test in 
making its determination.2  In Sell v. United States, the United States 
Supreme Court established a four-pronged test for determining whether a 
court should grant a request to medicate a defendant involuntarily.3  A 
court may not grant such a request unless the government shows that (1) 
an important government interest is at stake in prosecuting the defendant 
to be medicated, (2) medicating the defendant involuntarily will 
significantly further the important government interest, (3) medicating 
the defendant involuntarily is necessary to further the important 
government interest, and (4) the involuntary medication of the defendant 
is medically appropriate.4  The Ninth Circuit held that because the 
government failed to establish the facts necessary to satisfy all four 
 1 United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 2 Id.; see also Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180-81 (2003). 
 3 Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-81. 
 4 Id. 
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prongs of the Sell test by clear and convincing evidence, the district court 
erred in authorizing the involuntary medication of the defendant.5 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On June 27, 2006, Vicente Ruiz-Gaxiola (Ruiz) was arrested for 
illegally reentering the United States after being deported.6  If found 
guilty of the charge, Ruiz faced the sentencing guidelines’ suggested 
imprisonment of 100 to 125 months.7 
After Ruiz’s arrest, his attorney moved for an evaluation of Ruiz’s 
competency to stand trial.8  Ruiz was subsequently diagnosed with 
Delusional Disorder, grandiose type,9 and found incompetent to stand 
trial.10  The magistrate judge committed Ruiz to the custody of the 
Attorney General, whereupon he was transferred to the Federal Medical 
Center in Butner, North Carolina (“FMC”), and evaluated to determine 
the potential for his competence to be restored.11  After his evaluation at 
FMC, where Ruiz’s diagnosis was confirmed, the staff members who 
evaluated him recommended that Ruiz take psychotropic medication.12  
He refused.13  In a written report, the evaluators requested that the court 
issue an order allowing FMC to medicate Ruiz against his will for the 
sole purpose of restoring his competency for trial.14  The report 
acknowledged the need to prove all of the Sell factors, and explained 
why, in the opinion of the evaluators, all of the factors were satisfied.15 
Because the Ninth Circuit disfavors Sell orders,16 the magistrate 
judge first sought to answer the government’s request on an alternative 
basis and ordered a Harper hearing17 to determine whether Ruiz was 
 5 Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at 707. 
 6 Id. at 688. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. at n.1 (“The 2006 Merck Manual of Medicine describes Delusional Disorder as a 
distinct disorder ‘characterized by non-bizarre delusions (false beliefs) that persist for at least 1 
[month], without other symptoms of schizophrenia.’ The Manual describes the disorder as 
uncommon, and with respect to the grandiose subtype, notes that ‘the patient believes he has a great 
talent or has made an important discovery.’”). 
 10 Id. at 689. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. (citing United States v. Rivera-Guerrero, 426 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
 17 The Supreme Court in Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) held, inter alia, that 
medically treating a prisoner against his or her will does not violate substantive due process if the 
2
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gravely disabled or a danger to himself or others.18  Ruiz was found to be 
neither.19  The magistrate judge then held a Sell hearing.20 
Two co-authors of the FMC report testified as expert witnesses for 
the government.21  First was Dr. Mark Cheltenham, a staff psychiatrist 
who had been at FMC for seventeen months.22  As of the date of the 
hearing, Dr. Cheltenham had not been board certified in psychiatry.23  
Second was Carlton Pyant, a forensic psychologist who had been with 
the Bureau of Prisons for fifteen years.24  Dr. Cheltenham met with Ruiz 
four or five times for a total of approximately three hours, and Dr. Pyant 
met with Ruiz at least seven times.25  The expert witness for the defense, 
Dr. Robert Cloninger, was a psychiatrist with extensive credentials 
ranging from a private psychiatric practice to professorship at 
Washington University, and he had published hundreds of articles and 
several books on the subject of psychiatry.26  Dr. Cloninger met with 
Ruiz via video teleconference for two hours and ten minutes.27  In 
addition, he reviewed Ruiz’s competency report, the FMC report, and the 
Harper hearing report.28 
Both sides agreed that Ruiz was incompetent to stand trial, but they 
disagreed as to whether he should be medicated against his will.29  At the 
hearing, Dr. Cheltenham stated that he believed the proposed use of the 
drug Haldol Decanoate30 as a treatment was substantially likely to restore 
Ruiz’s competence and unlikely to cause side effects in the short period 
of time that the drug would be administered for the trial.31  He also 
opined that, because Ruiz was refusing to take any medication, there was 
no less-intrusive alternative available and that the treatment was 
medically appropriate.32  Conversely, Dr. Cloninger opined that use of 
prisoner is found to be a danger to himself or herself or others.  A Harper hearing evaluates evidence 
to make such a determination. 
 18 Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at 689 (citing Harper, 494 U.S. 210). 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 690. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 689. 
 31 Id. at 690. 
 32 Id. 
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the drug would likely exacerbate Ruiz’s delusions rather than restore 
competency, and that he would immediately face the risk of serious and 
possibly irreversible side effects from the medication.33  He further 
stated that the proposed treatment was not medically appropriate and that 
a less-intrusive alternative was available in the form of a “trusting 
therapeutic alliance.”34 
On June 3, 2008, the magistrate judge issued a Report and 
Recommendations.35  He found that the government had met its burden 
of proving each of the Sell factors by clear and convincing evidence, and 
he recommended that the district court grant the government’s request.36 
Ruiz filed objections with the district court and requested a stay in the 
event that the district court followed the magistrate judge’s 
recommendation.37 
On August 19, 2008, the district court denied Ruiz’s objections and 
adopted the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law 
and authorized the government to medicate Ruiz against his will.38  The 
court stayed the order for thirty days to allow Ruiz to appeal the 
decision.39  On September 17, 2008, the Ninth Circuit stayed the order of 
the district court pending resolution of the appeal.40 
II. NINTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit began its discussion by recognizing that the 
United States Supreme Court has, on three occasions, “recognized a 
liberty interest in freedom from unwanted antipsychotic drugs”41 and has 
only allowed involuntary medication in “highly-specific factual and 
medical circumstances.”42 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 691. 
 41 Id. (citing United States v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1045, 1053 (9th Cir. 2004)); see also Sell v. 
United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992); Washington v. Harper, 
494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
 42 Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at 691 (citing United States v. Rivera-Guerrero, 426 F.3d 1130, 
1136 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
4
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A. STANDARD OF PROOF 
When the Supreme Court decided Sell, it did not explicitly set forth 
the standard of proof that must be met by the government to establish the 
Sell factors, nor had the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of standard of 
proof in this context.43  Due in part to the “particularly severe” 
interference with a person’s liberty, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Sell 
inquiries “call[] for a more stringent burden of proof.”44  Agreeing with 
every other circuit that has addressed the issue, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the government must prove all prongs of the Sell test by 
clear and convincing evidence.45 
B. SELL TEST 
In Sell v. United States, the Supreme Court established a four-
pronged test to determine when it is constitutionally permissible to 
administer antipsychotic medications against a person’s will.46  The 
Court announced that the factors should not be treated as a balancing 
test; rather, the government must prove each factor independently by 
clear and convincing evidence.47 
The first factor, the government’s interest in prosecuting Ruiz, was 
primarily a legal issue.48  Thus, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district 
court’s ruling on the first factor de novo.49  The remaining three factors 
required the court to consider the testimony of expert witnesses and 
evaluate medical evidence.50  Thus, those factors were reviewed for clear 
error.51  Clear error occurs when, “although there is evidence to support 
it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”52 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 692. 
 45 Id.; see United States v. Bush, 585 F.3d 806, 814 (4th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. 
Grape, 549 F.3d 591, 598 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Payne, 539 F.3d 505, 508-09 (6th Cir. 
2008); United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107, 1114 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Gomes, 387 
F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 46 Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at 691; see Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-81. 
 47 Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at 691. 
 48 Id. at 693. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. (quoting United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1260 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)). 
5
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1. Whether Important Government Interest Is at Stake 
The first prong of the Sell test requires that the government prove it 
has an “important government interest” in prosecuting the defendant.53  
When determining whether a government interest is important, the court 
weighs several considerations, with each case evaluated on its own 
distinct facts.54  There are circumstances in which particular facts will 
lessen an otherwise important government interest.55  For example, if a 
defendant refuses to be medicated and as a result has been confined for a 
period of time as long as or longer than the sentence recommended for 
the offense for which he or she is charged, the government’s interest in 
forcing that defendant to be medicated and brought before the court to 
stand trial would be diminished.56  The court uses the sentencing 
guideline range as a starting point to determine whether a crime is 
serious enough to satisfy this first prong.57 
Here, because of Ruiz’s extensive criminal history, the guidelines 
suggested a sentence of 100-125 months.58  In addition, the fact that Ruiz 
was arrested just fourteen months after he was released from prison 
served to tip the balance toward finding an important government 
interest.59  Although there appeared to be no possibility that Ruiz would 
be subject to a civil confinement based on his mental illness, he had been 
incarcerated for more than forty-seven months since his arrest.60  
However, the court noted, because of the length of Ruiz’s suggested 
sentence, he would still be subject to an additional fifty-three to seventy-
eight months behind bars.61  The court also considered the likelihood 
Ruiz would reenter the country again illegally.62  Because of his mental 
condition, Ruiz believed God wanted him to be in the United States.63  
Although the court declined to address whether this circumstance would 
make prosecution of Ruiz more or less important, the court, for purposes 
of this case, “assume[d]” that this prosecution was an important 
 53 Id. (quoting Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003)). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 694 (citing United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 F.3d 908, 919 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 695. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
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government interest.  Therefore, the district court did not err in 
determining that the government proved the first prong of the Sell test.64 
2. Whether Involuntary Medication Will Further Government Interest 
Under the Sell test, the second prong requires that the government 
prove that “‘involuntary medication will significantly further’ its interest 
in prosecuting the defendant for the charged offense.”65  This prong has 
two parts: (1) “that administration of the drugs is substantially likely to 
render the defendant competent to stand trial,” and (2) “that 
administration of the drugs is substantially unlikely to have side effects 
that will interfere significantly with the defendant’s ability to assist 
counsel in conducting a trial defense, thereby rendering the trial 
unfair.”66  After hearing testimony from both the government’s and the 
defendant’s experts, the magistrate judge set forth his findings in his 
Report and Recommendations.67  He concluded that the treatment 
proposed by the government was 
designed to reduce Defendant’s delusions, restore normal thought 
processes, improve cognitive functioning in the courtroom and enable 
Defendant to assist his attorney. Consequently, the medication is 
substantially likely to render Defendant competent to proceed to trial 
and substantially unlikely to produce side effects that would interfere 
with Defendant’s ability to assist his attorney or that would be harmful 
to him.68 
The Ninth Circuit emphatically disagreed with the magistrate judge’s 
reasoning that because a treatment is designed to do something means 
that it will do what it was designed to do.69  The second prong requires 
that the government prove what its treatment is substantially likely to do 
(and what it is not substantially likely to do, i.e., cause dangerous side 
effects); thus, proving only what it was designed to do is insufficient.70  
The government must prove that the treatment is substantially likely to 
restore competency.71 
The Ninth Circuit also found that the magistrate judge failed to 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. (quoting Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003)). 
 66 Id. (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 181). 
 67 Id. at 695-96. 
 68 Id. at 696 (quoting magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
7
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make any findings of fact as they pertained to the second prong.72  In 
addition, the court noted that the district court failed to comply with 
procedural safeguards that are required when a person’s liberties are at 
stake.73  The Ninth Circuit pointed out that such a failure on the part of 
the district court, in and of itself, would prevent it from upholding the 
district court’s involuntary medication order.74  In some cases, remand at 
that point would be appropriate to allow the district court to make the 
necessary findings of fact.  In this case, however, a review of the record 
convinced the court of appeals the district court on remand would not be 
able to make any findings that would support a conclusion that the 
government had satisfied the second prong.75 
Reviewing the record, the Ninth Circuit considered two questions 
that were vigorously disputed.76 First, the court considered whether the 
use of antipsychotic drugs is a clinically accepted treatment for 
Delusional Disorder.77  Second, the court evaluated whether a 2007 study 
conducted at FMC establishes that involuntary medication of detainees 
with Delusional Disorder restores competency.78 
As to the first issue, the government evaluators in Ruiz’s FMC 
evaluation report opined that the use of antipsychotic drugs is the 
accepted and appropriate treatment for individuals with Delusional 
Disorder.79  However, the government offered only Ruiz’s evaluation 
report without any published authority in support of its contentions.80  In 
contrast, the defense expert, Dr. Cloninger, testified that there is no 
clinical consensus as to whether Delusional Disorder should be treated 
with antipsychotic medications.81  The defense supported its contention 
by introducing into evidence the Merck Manual of Medicine (considered 
to be the medical equivalent to Black’s Law Dictionary), which states 
that the established treatment for Delusional Disorder is “an effective 
physician-patient relationship” and that there is insufficient data 
available to support the use of drugs in the treatment.82  The 
government’s expert witness, Dr. Cheltenham, later admitted there was 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 697. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. (quoting THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 1573 (Mark H. Beers et 
al. eds., 18th ed. 2006)). 
8
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“no explicit practice guideline or consensus on . . . how to treat patients 
with delusional disorder, and particularly as it regards medications.”83  
Based on the conflicting testimony, the court found that there was no 
support for the contention that the proposed treatment would be likely to 
restore Ruiz to competency.84 
As to the second question, the government offered the results of a 
study completed at FMC in which twenty-two incompetent, non-violent 
pretrial detainees with Delusional Disorder were treated with 
antipsychotic medications.85  Dr. Cheltenham testified that seventy-seven 
percent of the treated detainees were restored to competency;86 however, 
the defense argued that the FMC study lacked untreated control subjects 
and cited other studies that had similar results without the use of 
antipsychotic medications.87  In addition, Dr. Cloninger pointed out that 
the subjects in the study were not being involuntarily medicated.88  In his 
opinion, the involuntary medication of Ruiz was likely to worsen his 
condition because he would fight back due to a feeling of 
powerlessness.89 
The Ninth Circuit found that the government mainly “relied on the 
effects of antipsychotic medication on delusional thought processes 
generally, rather than evidence specific to the particular mental illness 
from which Ruiz suffers.”90  The court further noted that the expertise 
and knowledge of Dr. Cheltenham, the expert for the government, 
regarding Delusional Disorder was far outweighed by that of Dr. 
Cloninger, the defense expert.91  As a result, the court concluded that 
“the generalized statements and unsupported assertions of the 
government experts, when contrasted with the specific and authoritative 
rebuttal evidence presented by the defense,” were insufficient to prove 
by clear and convincing evidence that the proposed treatment of 
involuntary medication was substantially likely to restore competency.92  
Thus, the court held that the district court erred in finding that the 
government proved the second prong by clear and convincing 
 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 





 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 698-99.
 89 Id. a
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 699-700.
 92 Id. a
9
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evidence.93  Because the court found against the government on the first 
part of the prong, it did not address the second part of the prong, whether 
the treatment was substantially unlikely to cause dangerous side effects 94
3. Whether Involuntary Medication Is Necessary to Further 
 Government Interest 
Under the third prong of the Sell test, the government must prove 
that the proposed treatment is necessary to further the important 
government interest and that “any alternative, less intrusive treatments 
are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results.”95  In order for the 
court to find that involuntary medication is necessary it is a natural 
prerequisite that the second prong first be satisfied.96  Here, the fact that 
the government failed to prove that medicating Ruiz against his will 
would further an important government interest meant it would be 
impossible to then prove that involuntarily medicating Ruiz was 
necessary to accomplish that important government interest.97  
Nevertheless, the court went on to evaluate the evidence as if the second 
prong of the Sell test had been established.98 
The defense favored a treatment that was less intrusive than 
medication and suggested a “therapeutic alliance” between a private 
psychiatrist and Ruiz.99  The magistrate judge found that this alternative 
was unlikely to achieve the same results as the government’s proposed 
involuntary medication.100  The magistrate reasoned that the defense 
expert’s proposal was based on only two hours and ten minutes of 
teleconference interviews while the government experts spent 
substantially more time with Ruiz.101  The Ninth Circuit was troubled by 
this reasoning because of the common nature of cases that are evaluated 
under the Sell test; defendants are generally detained in federal medical 
centers, and therefore, government experts are far more likely to have 
more time with the defendant.102  Thus, the amount of time spent with 
the defendant should not have been the main basis for such a finding.103  
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 701 n.12. 
 95 Id. at 701 (quoting Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003)). 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 701-03. 
 99 Id. at 701. 
 100 Id. at 702. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
10
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However, based on other factors, specifically that Ruiz did not believe he 
was mentally ill, did not believe that he needed any medication or 
treatment, and believed there was a conspiracy against him, the Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that it would be unlikely that he would voluntarily 
participate in a therapeutic treatment as proposed by the defense.104  
Thus, the court determined that if the government had established the 
second prong, it would also have established the third prong.105 
4. Whether Administration of the Medication Is Medically Appropriate 
Reflecting the importance of the liberty interests at issue, the fourth 
and final prong of the Sell test requires that the government prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that the proposed treatment is “in the 
patient’s best medical interest in light of his medical condition.”106  The 
Ninth Circuit pointed out that the Supreme Court’s use of the word 
“patient,” in this prong, as opposed to “defendant” in the other prongs, 
demonstrates that courts must consider the long-term medical 
consequences to the patient rather than the short-term interests of the 
government.107 
The magistrate judge found that the government satisfied this prong 
of the Sell test.108  The Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed and explained 
that the magistrate judge had erroneously relied on his flawed analysis in 
prong two to find that the government satisfied its burden in prong 
four.109  The Ninth Circuit explained that, while the second prong 
requires that the treatment be substantially likely to restore competence 
and substantially unlikely to cause harmful side effects, the fourth prong 
requires that the court “consider all of the medical consequences of the 
proposed involuntary medication, including those consequences that may 
. . . result in long term side effects.”110  Both the prosecution and defense 
agreed that Haldol could cause harmful side effects such as tardive 
dyskinesia, described as a “very disfiguring side effect that can affect 
muscles anywhere in the body.”111  The experts testified that tardive 
dyskinesia can be reversed in up to fifty percent of patients if it is 
 104 Id. at 702-03. 
 105 Id. at 703. 
 106 Id. (quoting Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003), and adding emphasis). 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at 703-04. 
 109 Id. at 704. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 705. 
11
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detected early.112  The government argued that the treatment would be 
administered only for the duration of the trial and that the side effects 
would be unlikely to occur in that short period of time.113  It was 
undisputed, however, that if Ruiz did not continue to take the 
medications indefinitely, the positive effects of the drugs would end.114  
Thus, the court noted, from Ruiz’s standpoint, the benefit of being 
competent for the short period of trial and then being returned to a 
delusional state was not worth even the small risk of a disfiguring side 
effect.115  The court again stated that the government failed to offer any 
evidence that Haldol would render Ruiz competent for the duration of 
trial preparation and trial.116 
For the above reasons, the court found that the district court erred in 
concluding that the government proved by clear and convincing evidence 
that the proposed treatment was in Ruiz’s best medical interest in light of 
his medical condition.117 
III. HOW OTHER CIRCUITS HAVE ADDRESSED THE SELL FACTORS 
Since the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Sell, several 
circuits have been faced with the task of determining whether the 
government successfully proved all four of the Sell prongs when it 
requested an order to involuntarily medicate a defendant.118  Although all 
circuits to date have agreed that the standard of proof should be that the 
government must prove each and every prong by clear and convincing 
evidence, what constitutes sufficient proof for each prong is still subject 
to disagreement.119 
There seems to be general agreement among the circuits when it 
comes to the first prong of the Sell test.120  Overwhelmingly, courts 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 706. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 630 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Fazio, 
599 F.3d 835 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Grape, 549 F.3d 591 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Green, 532 F.3d 538 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 119 Compare, e.g., Fazio, 599 F.3d at 841 (accepting the testimony of a psychiatrist (a medical 
doctor) who had worked closely with the defendant and whose opinion addressed the specific 
defendant’s medical condition), with Bradley, 417 F.3d at 1114-15 (finding that the testimony of a 
psychologist (a Ph.D.) stating that the proposed treatment was “[t]he treatment of choice for a 
psychotic disorder” was sufficient). 
 120 See Fazio, 599 F.3d at 840; Grape, 549 F.3d at 600; Green, 532 F.3d at 547; Bradley, 417 
F.3d at 1116. 
12
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agree, and Sell itself seems to confirm, that prosecuting a serious crime 
is, in and of itself, an important government interest.121  To prove that the 
crime in the case at issue is serious, the general opinion is that the 
sentencing guidelines are the appropriate place to start.122  The courts do 
not specifically elaborate, but the obvious implication is that the longer 
the suggested sentence, the more likely the court would be to hold that a 
given crime is serious.123  The Sixth Circuit added that violence, 
although an important factor, is not required to find that a crime is 
serious.124  The Sixth Circuit also found that the crime need not be one 
against person or property to be considered serious.125  After considering 
the sentencing guidelines, the Third Circuit noted that courts should also 
consider mitigating factors before determining that the involuntary 
medication of the defendant is an important government interest.126  
Although different circuits specify different considerations, there does 
not seem to be a conflict among the circuits on the first prong o
127 
There is less agreement among the circuits when it comes to their 
analysis of the evidence required for the second prong of the Sell test.128  
The second prong requires the government to prove that the proposed 
treatment is substantially likely to render the defendant competent while 
substantially unlikely to cause side effects that would hinder the 
defendant’s ability to aid in his or her defense.129  As to part one, in cases 
where there was an actual medical history of the defendant responding 
well to the proposed medications, the analysis was brief, as may be 
expected.130  In cases where the defendant has no personal history of 
using medication, however, courts have given great deference to 
statistical data as explained by government experts.131  In trusting the 
opinion of a government expert, one circuit went so far as to find that the 
 121 See, e.g., Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003); Fazio, 599 F.3d at 840; Grape, 
549 F.3d at 600; Green, 532 F.3d at 547; Bradley, 417 F.3d at 1116. 
 122 See, e.g., Grape, 549 F.3d at 600; Green, 532 F.3d at 547. 
 123 See, e.g., Grape, 549 F.3d at 600; Green, 532 F.3d at 547. 
 124 Green, 532 F.3d at 548. 
 125 Id. at 551. 
 126 Grape, 549 F.3d at 600. 
 127 See, e.g., Grape, 549 F.3d at 600-03; Green, 532 F.3d at 547-51. 
 128 Compare, e.g., United States v. Fazio, 599 F.3d 835 (8th Cir. 2010) (providing very little 
analysis of drug side-effects), with Green, 532 F.3d 538 (considering more thoroughly what the side 
effects of the medications will be). 
 129 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003). 
 130 See Grape, 549 F.3d at 603-05; Green, 532 F.3d at 552-54. 
 131 See Fazio, 599 F.3d at 840-41; United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107, 1114-15 (10th 
Cir. 2005). 
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stantially likely”132 to render the 
defen
istency among the circuits when it comes to prong 
two 
  There seems to be little agreement as to what is 
nece
expert’s testimony that “[h]e was guardedly optimistic that 
administration of antipsychotic medication would materially render aid 
in restoring [the defendant] to competency,” was sufficient to support a 
finding that the medication was “sub
dant competent to stand trial.133 
As to the second part of prong two, courts vary widely as to how 
much emphasis is placed on possible side effects.134  Some courts appear 
to pay little or no attention to this requirement,135 while others have 
placed significantly more weight on potential side effects.136  Thus, there 
has been little cons
of the Sell test. 
In those circuits that have analyzed the third prong, the findings of 
the courts varied greatly.137  The Tenth Circuit simply concluded, 
without any independent analysis, that absent clear error in the lower 
court’s analysis of prongs two and four, involuntary medication of the 
defendant was necessary to further the important government interest.138  
The Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, required proof from the 
government that no less-intrusive alternative was likely to accomplish 
the desired result.139
ssary to satisfy prong three. 
Finally, when considering the fourth Sell prong, whether the 
proposed treatment is medically appropriate in light of a particular 
defendant’s medical condition, circuits have again differed in what they 
have accepted as proof.140  The Eighth Circuit determined that the 
government had met its burden with testimony from a psychiatrist who 
 
 132 See Sell, 539 U.S. at 181. 
 133 Bradley, 417 F.3d at 1115 (emphasis added). 
 134 Compare, e.g., Fazio, 599 F.3d 835 (8th Cir. 2010) (providing very little analysis of drug 
side-effects), with Green, 532 F.3d 538 (considering more thoroughly what the side effects of the 
edic
 See United States v. Diaz, 630 F.3d 1314, 1333-34 (11th Cir. 2011); Green, 532 F.3d at 
5
36 (requiring independent proof from the 
over about prong three). 
condition the defendant had, rather than on the specific 
efend ion). 
m ations will be). 
 135 See Fazio, 599 F.3d at 840-41; Grape, 549 F.3d at 604-05; Bradley, 417 F.3d at 1115. 
 136
553- 4. 
 137 Compare Bradley, 417 F.3d at 1117 (using its findings for prongs two and four to make its 
decision about prong three), with Diaz, 630 F.3d at 1335-
g nment before making a decision 
 138 Bradley, 417 F.3d at 1117. 
 139 Diaz, 630 F.3d at 1335-36. 
 140 Compare Fazio, 599 F.3d at 841 (holding that opinion testimony from a medical doctor 
based on the defendant’s current medical condition satisfied the government’s burden as to the 
fourth Sell factor), with Bradley, 417 F.3d at 1112 (holding that the government satisfied its burden 
as to the fourth Sell factor with testimony from a clinical psychologist whose opinion was based on 
the standard treatment for the kind of 
d ant’s current medical condit
14
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into consideration any specific health conditions of the 
defen
are unclear as to how exactly they should be analyzing 





had worked closely with the defendant.141  In that case, the doctor 
recommended the proposed treatment based on the defendant’s diagnosis 
and stated that the treatment was appropriate in light of the specific 
defendant’s current medical condition.142  The Tenth Circuit seemed to 
set a lower burden of proof for the government by determining that the 
fourth prong was satisfied by testimony from a psychologist who 
reported that “[b]ecause treatment with psychiatric medications is the 
intervention of choice for [the defendant’s] condition, it is my opinion . . 
. that treatment of his illness with psychiatric medications is medically 
appropriate.”143  In that case, the expert’s opinion was based on the 
normally accepted treatment for the defendant’s disorder, but it did not 
seem to take 
dant.144 
Based on these vast differences in analyses, it would appear that the 
appellate courts 
As compared to other circuits that have addressed a Sell challenge, 
the Ninth Circuit gave a much more thorough and reasoned opinion as to 
how it read the requirements set forth by the Supreme Court.  By 
establishing a standard of proof for Sell inquiries in Ruiz-Gaxiola, the 
Ninth Circuit has provided lower courts with a clear guideline to evaluate 
cases in which the government wishes to medicate non-violent, 
incompetent defendants against their will solely for the purpose of 
gaining competency for trial.145  Although the Supreme Court had 
previously laid out specific requirements for such challenges, it failed
ide the standard by which the government must prove its case.146 
In addition, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the importance of 
addressing each and every prong of the Sell test.147  The government 
cannot rely on proof of one prong to establish another prong.148  
Although there is some overlap among the prongs, and multiple prongs 
can rely on similar facts, the purpose behind each prong is different and 
 141 Fazio, 599 F.3d at 841. 
ley, 417 F.3d at 1112. 
 2010). 
tes, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). 
la, 623 F.3d at 691. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Brad
 144 Id. 
 145 United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684, 692 (9th Cir.
 146 Id. at 691; see Sell v. United Sta
 147 Ruiz-Gaxio
 148 Id. at 704. 
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ates such a restraint requires a showing of 
extre
t court’s 
order authorizing involuntary medication of Vicente Ruiz-Gaxiola.153 
MICHELLE R. CRUZ* 
 
 
must be addressed separately.149  The government, and the courts hearing 
these cases, must be mindful of the fact that a person’s liberty is at stake 
and that in the United St
me circumstances.150 
In Ruiz-Gaxiola the Ninth Circuit found that the government fell 
short of proving all four prongs of the Sell test by clear and convincing 
evidence.151  Specifically, the government failed to prove that the 
proposed treatment – the involuntary medication of Ruiz with the drug 
Haldol – was substantially likely to restore competence and was in 
Ruiz’s best medical interest.152  Because the district court erred in 
finding to the contrary, the Ninth Circuit reversed the distric
 149 Id. at 704-05. 
 150 Id. at 691-93, 695-96, 703, 707. 
 151 Id. at 707. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, CA; B.S. 
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